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Since the fall of communism Hungary has made sustained efforts in the East Central 
European region to establish and develop a model of non-territorial autonomy for its relatively 
small minorities (Smith-Hiden 2012: 113). Even so, despite the country’s relatively 
homogeneous ethnic composition, a recurring topic of debate has been government policy 
towards the domestic minority groups, as well as the relationship and the degree of 
consistency between domestic minority policy and the kin-state activities targeting ethnic 
Hungarians abroad. On this issue a rather contradictory picture emerges from the literature. 
On the one hand, the constitutional amendments of 1989-1990 and the introduction – in 1993 
– of the system of elected minority self-governments (MSGs) clearly placed Hungary among 
the leading European countries in the field of minority protection and led Hungary’s 
politicians and other domestic actors to emphasise, in a rhetorical and symbolic fashion, the 
exemplary and inspirational nature of Hungarian model. On the other hand, a growing number 
of scholars have contended that Hungary’s domestic minority policy has been motivated 
principally by a desire to improve the situation of the Hungarian minorities abroad by setting 
an example and putting pressure on the neighbouring countries.  
Despite several subsequent amendments to the 1993 legislation, including the 2005 law, 
which implemented crucial institutional changes,1 it would seem Hungary’s minority policy 
does not only reflect a commitment to the Hungarian minorities abroad. In a country where 
the minorities are relatively small, are dispersed around the country, feel themselves closely 
attached to the state and to mainstream Hungarian society, and – with the exception of the 
Roma, the country’s largest minority group – are well integrated in socio-economic terms, it 
comes as no surprise that official policies seek to create good standards of minority 
protection, thereby empowering minorities and satisfying their needs and interests. However, 
recent research has found that behind the rhetoric the desire to set standards was of limited 
significance. Other concerns proved to be much more influential during both the formulation 
and further development of the autonomy model. Even the domestic minority objectives could 
not be fully achieved, and in certain instances the participation of members of minorities was 
constrained in the decision-making processes affecting their lives.   
The discussions around the nature and objectives of minority policy have been revived in 
recent years. The debate has become more intense since the 2010 parliamentary elections. 
With its unprecedented two-thirds parliamentary majority, the new right-wing government, as 
part of its efforts to consolidate the state, redefined the basis of the political community and 
solidified and codified traditional values and norms by passing a new constitution 
(Fundamental Law).2 In accordance with the new constitutional provisions, in 2011 a new law 
on the rights of minorities3 replaced the 1993 legislation. Both the design and some specific 
parts of the new law on minorities were criticised by international and domestic actors. 
Concerns have been voiced over the shift from a predominantly civic definition of the nation 
to an ethno-cultural conception, whereby the new constitution designates Hungarian as the 
official language and grants the possibility of dual citizenship and voting rights to ethnic 
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Hungarians abroad. The Venice Commission commenced investigations in 2011-2012, while 
the Commissioner for Fundamental Rights requested the Hungarian Constitutional Court to 
examine some points of the new law that he deemed unconstitutional. The Court found that 
the law did not raise constitutional concerns. 4 Being at an advanced stage of linguistic 
assimilation, the domestic minorities are invariably recognized as an organic part of the 
political community and some forms of preferential parliamentary representation are provided 
to them. Even so, the increasing role of ethnicity in politics and the shift to an ethnic approach 
inevitably affect their political opportunities. For this reason, some minority experts and 
politicians regard the recent changes as a backward step in minority protection. Meanwhile 
the government and other domestic actors still insist on the standard-setting nature of 
Hungary’s minority policy framework.   
To address the issues above, the following two sections aim to present the main socio-
economic features of the minorities in Hungary and review the nature of, and reasons for, the 
new minority law. The third and fourth parts of the case study then take the analysis further 
by seeking to examine in broad terms the relevant political efforts and debates as well as the 
main elements and changes of the institutional arrangements since the adoption of the 1993 
law, with particular emphasis on an evaluation of the emerging deficiencies. The focus is on 
the membership, electoral rules, and competences and finances of the autonomy structures at 
various levels. Although the rules and institutions of this framework are currently undergoing 
transition, lessons can be drawn from the preparations for and implementation of all minority 
laws. The findings may influence our view of much-debated theoretical dilemmas and specific 
practical problems. A specific question is how legitimate and representative structures can be 
built, taking into account the sensitive data of ethnic affiliation, the high level of assimilation, 
and the internal democracy of minority communities.  
THE ETHNOCULTURAL DESCRIPTION OF HUNGARY 
Most of the officially acknowledged 13 minority groups (Bulgarian, Roma, Greek, Croat, 
Polish, German, Armenian, Romanian, Ruthene, Serb, Slovak, Slovene, and Ukrainian) 
settled in the central area of the former Kingdom of Hungary, the present territory of 
Hungary, even before the formation of modern nation-states and the standardization of 
modern languages. Yet, once these nation-states were formed, for a great part of the 20th 
century these co-ethnics were not really able to attract the attention of their  kin-states, 
especially in view of their relatively small size and their close affiliation with Hungary. On 
account of this close association with both the state and the Hungarian majority, as reflected 
in census data, scholars often view their identities as dual, being composed of both ethnic 
minority and Hungarian elements. This aspect distinguishes them from the more numerous 
and nationally conscious minority Hungarian communities in the neighbouring states. The 
pronounced differences in history often contributed to the neglect of domestic minority issues 
and even to complacency in official policies. Unlike the Hungarian minorities abroad, the 
evolution of the domestic minorities was less affected by the border changes of the 20th 
century, and even the more numerous and officially recognized groups (Germans, Slovaks, 
Romanians, and Croats, Serbs, and Slovenes – usually under the common label of “Southern 
Slavs” after 1945) could not form larger blocs. Living in dispersed settlements and mostly 
rural communities, the minorities lacked intellectuals and were much more exposed to 
assimilation and the homogenizing efforts of the emerging modern Hungarian state. 
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Furthermore, the spoken pre-modern dialects, an underdeveloped vocabulary, limited 
opportunities for language use, a folkloristic culture, and a locally or regionally based ethnic 
consciousness or identity, meant that minority status was accompanied by lower social 
prestige. Forms of vertical mobility, such as migration to larger cities, attendance at college or 
university, marriage or employment outside the community, led to assimilation. As a result, 
for the older generations the dialect became “the language of remembering” (Erb-Knipf 
2000). For those who could complete some form of minority education and training, learning 
the previously unknown modern standardized language proved to be another challenge.   
Historical traumas, official state ideologies and policies, and the 20th century transformation 
of Hungarian society and economy were further factors contributing to the fall in numbers. 
Claims concerning the collective guilt of Germans were used to justify the relocation of 
approximately half of Hungary’s ethnic German community to Germany after the Second 
World War. Meanwhile, the Hungarian-Slovak population exchange led many nationally-
conscious Slovaks to leave the country, and a similar process ensued when Southern Slavs 
became subject to discrimination at the turn of 1950s after the expulsion of Yugoslavia from 
Cominform. Lacking recognized status, Roma were also subject to several forms of 
discrimination. As a result, minority members were likely to assume that declaring their 
ethnic identity might become a source of conflicts and disadvantages. In the economy, the 
system of central economic planning focussed on the rapid development of heavy industry; 
jobs thus shifted from traditional agriculture to industries. This development required the 
labour force to move from villages to the urban industrial centres. Those who managed to stay 
in their villages faced forcible collectivization, whereby their former private properties and 
the division of family labour were replaced by collective work (Dobos 2011: 65). Until the 
end of the 1960s the ruling Communist ideology held that the construction of socialism would 
eradicate national-ethnic cleavages automatically within a few decades. The Communist 
party-state, moreover, enabled only certain direct cultural and educational demands to be met; 
the foundation of independent organizations with grassroots presence was prohibited (Tóth 
2005: 185).  
In line with the ‘ethnic revival’ of the 1960s, certain national and ethnic claims gained ground 
in many post-Stalinist East Central European countries. The main reasons for them had to do 
with the emerging tensions between Communist countries, the generational replacement of 
the political elites, and, in Hungary, the internal pressure on party leaders to take steps 
towards improving the situation of the Hungarian communities in the neighbouring countries,  
which tended to be targets of homogenizing measures (Bárdi 2011). The growing significance 
of the Hungarian communities abroad had implications for the domestic minorities. 
Meanwhile, the failure of the previous assimilatory policy also became evident, as the 
minorities still existed. The new policy line thus laid emphasis on the positive role that could 
be played by the minorities with their dual affiliation to both Hungary and the kin-states. 
Their constructive role in bilateral relations (expressed in the Engelsian term of the 
minorities’ ‘bridge-role’) was highlighted, and as another element the new policy stressed the 
need for mutual efforts to preserve and develop minority features (officially referred to as 
‘Leninist nationality policy’). Failing to provide political possibilities to express minority 
needs, the paternalist and belated shift, which lasted until the end of the 1980s, was not able to 
improve significantly the situation in Hungary. This was demonstrated clearly by the census 
data, which showed a steady decrease in the minority population (Vékás 2005). Meanwhile 
expectations of the mutual support of minorities were not realised either, as both 
Czechoslovakia and Romania, the two crucial countries, rejected such a policy (Vago 1989: 
129-130). The reforms did not cover other smaller and more dispersed ethnic groups, and so 
the Bulgarians, Greeks and Poles were only allowed to found and maintain associations in a 
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controlled way. The regime did introduce serious measures aimed at improving the education, 
employment, and living conditions of the largest group, the Roma. In Hungary, the Roma 
community consists of at least three major ethnocultural and linguistic subgroups,5 but the 
regime recognized their distinct features only in the late 1970s. It was only after the political 
changes in the late 1980s that Roma received equal recognition in terms of their minority 
rights. 
Major shifts can be observed both in the identity structures and compositions of the 
minorities. In the aftermath of the First World War, in 1920, 11% of around 8 million 
inhabitants belonged to minorities. Recently, based on the census data from 2001 and 2011, 
the percentage of persons belonging to the 13 minorities grew from 5% to 6.5% of the 
population (approx. 650 thousand people) (see Table).6 This indicates, at first glance, some 
increase in the level of minority consciousness, but others remain sceptical about the data. 
First, the data differ from the estimates of the minority organizations. Such organisations, 
however, may have an interest in exaggerating the size and political weight of the various 
minorities. They may be ignoring the assimilation that occurred in the 20th century. However, 
the fact alone that the estimated number is at least twice as high as the official figures reveals 
the relatively high level of uncertainty surrounding minority identities. Second, some point 
out that it is difficult to make comparisons due to differing census methodology. More 
importantly, the vast majority of those expressing a minority identity also declared themselves 
to be Hungarian. If just one response could have been given to each question, which 
affiliation would they have preferred? Thirdly, some express doubt as to whether the question 
on the language used in the family and among friends is conducive to assessing ethnic 
belongings. With the exception of the Roma and Germans, it is questionable whether there is 
any real dissimilation in most of the cases. In addition, for greater comparability, experts may 
turn to the number of registered MSG voters as an additional primary source. Even though 
only adult Hungarian citizens had the right to register for MSG elections, the number of 
minority voters was not below the census data in all the cases. The difference may derive, to 
some extent, from weak minority loyalties, but it may also indicate electoral abuses. 
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 According to the latest census results from 2011, approximately 315,000 people – around 3% of the total 
population – declared themselves as Roma, but their estimated number is at least twice as high. The 
overwhelming majority is Hungarian-speaking, while s maller groups speak either a variant of Romani or Beash, 
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 In the last two censuses, dual and multiple affiliations could be recorded. In 2001 three responses could given 
to the four questions on ethnicity, while in 2011 two (anonymous and voluntary) responses could be given to the 
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Table: Data on the national and ethnic minorities from the censuses of 2001 and 2011, and the number of registered minority voters at the 2006 
and 2010 MSG elections7  
 
Minority Nationality 
(ethnicity) 
Native language Language used 
among friends 
and/or in the family 
Affinity 
with 
cultural 
values, 
traditions  
Persons Registered MSG voters 
2001 2011 2001 2011 2001 2011 2001 2001 2011 2006 2010 
Bulgarian 1,358 3,556 1,299 2,899 1,118 2,756  1,693 2,316 6,272 2,110 2,088 
Roma 189,984 308,957 48,438 54,339 53,323 61,143  129,259 205,720 315,583 106,333 133,492 
Greek 2,509 3,916  1,921 1,872 1,974 2,346  6,140 6,619 4,642 2,451 2,267 
Croat 15,597 23,561  14,326 13,716 14,788 16,053  19,715 25,730 26,774 11,090 11,571 
Polish 2,962 5,730  2,580 3,049 2,659 3,815  3,983 5,144 7,001 3,061 3,052 
German 62,105 131,951  33,774 38,248 53,040 95,661  88,416 120,344 185,696 45,983 46,629 
Armenian 620 3,293  294 444 300 496  836 1,165 3,571 2,361 2,357 
Romanian 7,995 26,345  8,482 13,886 8,215 17,983  9,162 14,781 35,641 4,404 5,277 
Ruthene 1,098 3,323 1,113 999 1,068 1,131 1,292 2,079 3,882 2,729 4,228 
Serb 3,816 7,210 3,388 3,078 4,186 5,713 5,279 7,350 10,038 2,143 2,432 
Slovak 17,693 29,647 11,817 9,888 18,057 16,266 26,631 39,266 35,208 15,049 12,282 
Slovene 3,025 2,385 3,180 1,723 3,119 1,745 3,442 4,832 2,820 991 1,025 
Ukrainian 5,070 5,633 4,885 3,384 4,519 3,245 4,779 7,393 7,396 1,084 1,338 
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The trend that emerges when comparing the two latest census data is a shift to prioritizing 
ethnic and cultural belongings over minority language use. For instance, the most extreme 
case is associated with the highly assimilated Slovak minority: only 30% of people expressing 
a Slovak identity in their responses to at least one of the four questions in 2001, declared 
Slovak to be their native language. The overall assessment of these predominantly Hungarian-
speaking minority groups, whose identities usually involve cultural ties and less often 
linguistic affiliations, is an exciting issue, especially in the Central and Eastern European 
context where the tradition of defining communities in ethno-cultural terms has been 
prevalent ever since the rise of nationalism and modern nation-states. While there has been an 
enduring discussion in Hungarian political thought even since the 19th century on the 
boundaries and potential characteristics of the Hungarian nation, the presence of mostly 
Hungarian-speaking subgroups in certain communities (Roma, Armenians) and the vague 
nature of ethnic identity have often given rise to debates over the complexity of belongings 
and the so-called “ethno-business”. The contestation of group boundaries also played a 
significant role at the minority elections, since the different subgroups often accused each 
other of participating in ethno-business. Within certain communities a recent phenomenon has 
reignited the debate: the arrival in Hungary of a significant number of persons who belong to 
the specific minority but were born abroad and are non-Hungarian citizens (or possess dual 
citizenship) (Tóth-Vékás 2009). This explains why the minorities have long sought to extend 
the application of minority law to foreign citizens established in Hungary. Such persons 
usually have favourable socioeconomic positions, good educational qualifications, better 
native language skills, close ties to the kin-states, and stronger ethnic identities. Even so, their 
attempts to contribute to minority public life and to the work of MSGs have caused tensions 
in certain cases.  
As already noted, minorities live dispersed throughout the country. Hungary has almost 3,200 
municipalities, and there are minority inhabitants in 2,500 of them. In the overwhelming 
majority of them, minority persons constitute only local minorities. This distribution 
precludes any possibility of territorial autonomy. Furthermore, municipalities that administer 
local affairs are the most important partners of MSGs. In contrast to earlier periods, the urban 
minority communities, especially the smaller ones, have become stronger. Yet, some 
traditional minorities, including the Roma, Croats, Germans, Romanians, Slovaks, and 
Slovenes, are still overrepresented in rural villages. Turning to age composition, we find that, 
with the exception of the Roma, who have a higher mortality rate, the younger generations are 
underrepresented within most of the minorities. In terms of the highest level of education and 
training, the indicators are also more favourable in the case of those minorities that are more 
affected by recent migration, while Roma show the poorest results. As one consequence of the 
distorted age structure, less than 22% of persons belonging to minorities were employed in 
2001. Indeed, among the Roma, the total ratio of young people, the unemployed, and the 
elderly population reached almost 90% (Mayer 2004: Appendix 8). Within most minorities, 
the employed segments worked either in the tertiary and service sector or in professional 
occupations, while Roma, Croat, Romanian and Slovene workers tended to be employed in 
manufacturing and agriculture. With the exception of the Roma, mixed marriages with 
members of the majority population are widespread in Hungary, and this fact illustrates 
parents’ ‘ethnic optimism’ that their children’s affiliation is more likely to be Hungarian. 
While several research projects have revealed strong anti-Roma sentiments among the 
population and the high level of rejection of Roma, very little is known about the different 
aspects of the minorities’ political behaviour. The number of minority organizations and 
ethnic parties may be viewed as indicative of their mobilization. However, despite the high 
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number of registered ethnic parties since 1989,8 their electoral failures reflect accurately the 
fact that in Hungary the ethnic components of personal identities generally have little impact 
on individuals’ political interests and voting preferences. In the light of such other factors as 
the electoral system, weak identities and the number and geographical spread of minority 
persons, it was obvious that their representation in the major decision-making bodies could be 
accomplished only in a preferential manner. (This will be discussed further in a later section.) 
Generally, with the exception of Roma, who face various challenges in everyday life as well 
as social and discriminatory problems (Bernát 2009), the minorities have been well- integrated 
into Hungarian society in socioeconomic terms. 
THE PROCESS LEADING TO THE ADOPTION OF THE 1993 MINORITY LAW   
The laws of 1993 and 2005 were both adopted as a result of long-term processes. Like the 
2011 law in force, they had a special place in the legal hierarchy, as their adoption and 
subsequent amendment required the support of two-thirds of MPs present. Preparations for 
the first law were begun already in 1988, during the decline of the Communist regime. The 
party apparatus initially involved in the process was gradually replaced by governmental 
bodies even before the first democratic elections in 1990. Having been granted the right to 
freely associate, the minorities found they had an opportunity to (re)organize themselves in 
democratic ways: the Roma, in particular, established the highest number of associations, and 
even those communities that had been denied recognition in the previous era created their 
own organizations. In order to overcome the legitimacy deficit caused by the growing number 
of organizations, the most relevant ones formed a Minority Roundtable in 1991. This 
umbrella organization soon became an accepted partner for the government. After the 
adoption of the law, as MSGs were elected and certain disagreements became apparent among 
the minorities, the individual national MSGs replaced the Roundtable, and subsequent efforts 
to create a common platform were less successful.         
The various actors contributing to the formulation had a number of goals, internal and 
external political values and motivations – a set of multiple objectives. As to the main 
motivations, according to the popular view shared by many scholars, the issue of the domestic 
minorities has always been subordinated to Hungary’s kin-state policy. It is argued that the 
main – if not only – reason for creating autonomy in Hungary is the issue of Hungarians 
abroad (Deets 2002: 39-40. Kymlicka 2007: 392. Tesser 2003: 506). Other authors consider 
this to be only one goal among many others, thereby leaving scope for the analysis of other 
relevant issues (Butler 2007: 1131. Edwards 1998: 349. Krizsán 2000: 249. Vermeersch 2003: 
13). Still others either completely ignore the issue or argue that the accusation against 
Hungary is unfounded.  
Such cross-border pressures and inducements were a constant feature of Central and Eastern 
European history in the 20th century. Indeed, one can argue that the issue of the Hungarian 
minorities abroad has been a recurrent topic in Hungarian politics ever since the 1960s. 
Further, since several prominent Hungarian politicians dealing with minority issues were born 
abroad, the persistence of the issue, as well as the allusions in elite rhetoric, are not surprising. 
Such factors even appeared in the discussion of the 2011 minority law. Further, 
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representatives of the Hungarian minorities abroad contributed to preparations for the 1993 
minority law. Inevitably, they urged the enactment of a law that would serve as a point of 
reference and a blueprint (Dobos 2011: 133). Viewed from another perspective, the reason 
behind the Hungarian model was not only to serve as a reference by quickly adopting and 
further developing the Western standards (Galbreath-McEvoy 2012: 278) but also to prevent 
international organizations and neighbours from criticising Hungary in the field of minority 
protection.9 An additional aim was to justify the actions of the Hungarian governments as 
they gave support to minority claims abroad. Similarly, the intention – made plain by the 
Hungarian Parliament after the first democratic elections in 199010 – to join the Euro-Atlantic 
community, to further develop existing international standards, and to attempt to conclude 
bilateral and regional agreements on minority protection – needed to be supported by a 
progressive domestic system. In addition, certain international actors, among them several 
leaders of the reunified Germany, used the Hungarian model as a reference point in their 
efforts to improve international norms. They gave their support to Hungary’s minority 
legislation, emphasizing its importance (Dobos 2011: 131). 
Given the less inclusive nature of nation-building efforts in the post-communist states and 
their rejection of minority claims, it seems very doubtful whether Hungary’s hopes of 
improving the situation of the Hungarian communities abroad by creating and maintaining a 
progressive domestic system of minority protection were realistic. However, in my view, 
foreign considerations were not the primary motivation. The choice is not between assuming 
the primacy of kin-state politics and completely ignoring the issue. Other factors must also be 
considered. One factor contributing to the adoption of the minority legislation seems to have 
been to compensate the previously discriminated Roma by making their legal status equal to 
that of the other recognized minorities. The great number of minority civil organizations, their 
rivalry and the legitimacy deficit, also contributed to the decision to create a system of elected 
MSGs.11  
The elaboration of the legislation and its further amendment were lengthy and complex 
processes involving various different actors with diverse interests. This resulted in sensitive 
political and legal compromises, which moved beyond merely symbolic elements. While the 
claim to be setting standards was certainly present in the rhetoric, most of the provisions were 
actually formulated before the parliamentary deliberative stage in negotiations held by 
relevant ministries, governmental agencies and the minority organizations. In addition, the 
law was basically to function in Hungary in accordance with domestic needs and resources 
and with the participation of domestic actors. Through the creation of new institutions, rights, 
duties, procedures, and funding possibilities, the legislation left much room for debates and 
compromises. At the same time, the capacities and competences of local municipalities, as 
well as the country’s overall economic and financial situation could not be ignored. At the 
time, Hungary was in transition to a capitalist market economy. Consequently, the major 
concerns were a lack of willingness to delegate appropriate powers to the minority bodies and 
inadequate financial resources. I therefore consider the aim of setting standards as just one of 
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several goals, many of which were suppressed at intervals or for a longer period of time in 
certain cases. 
Regarding the 1993 legislation, the literature often emphasizes the differences that arose 
between the so-called ‘national liberal’ and ‘autonomist’ approaches to minority rights. The 
former would have been satisfied by granting individual rights, and it aimed to regulate only 
what was necessary. Its main advocate, the Ministry of Justice, argued that in a democracy the 
right of association provided the essential basis to articulate social interests and values. In its 
view, the MSGs should not become more than voluntary associations with weak competences. 
By contrast, the latter concept, supported in particular by the Minority Roundtable, sought to 
extend the scope of regulation as far as possible, embracing collective rights, cultural 
autonomy, and financial guarantees and establishing elected bodies based on constitutional 
law. Although the autonomist discourse dominated the rhetoric and the elected form 
ultimately prevailed, the overall outcome bore the marks of both approaches.  
THE INSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM OF THE LEGISLATION OF 1993 AND 2005  
Membership and elections  
The relevant constitutional provisions declared that national and ethnic minorities had the 
right to establish MSGs, but defining the personal scope of the law and thus creating 
legitimate bodies was one of the most difficult tasks in view of the uncertain nature of ethnic 
identities, the huge differences between census data and estimates, and the claims by various 
ethnic groups. The minorities initially refused any kind of registration of persons with 
minority backgrounds, in view of historical experiences. This, however, made it almost 
impossible to assess the approximate number of persons to whom the law was to apply, while 
the principle of a person’s freedom to choose his or her identity had already been agreed upon 
during the preparatory phase. In the end, the compromise involved a legal definition of the 
term ‘national and ethnic minority’12 and an enumeration of 13 recognized minorities and 
their native languages, with the possibility of subsequently expanding this list. Further, the 
MSGs were integrated into the municipality system, which resolved the problem of defining 
personal scope.  
Until the 2005 amendment, the law distinguished three types of MSGs at local level, 
including the districts of the capital city. The most prevalent type was the directly elected one: 
due to the minorities’ rejection of registration, between 1994 and 2004 every Hungarian 
citizen had the right to vote for, and be elected to, MSGs. The voting took place in the same 
polling stations used in local municipality elections and on the same day.13 The two other, 
indirectly established forms were less frequent. Among these latter cases, if a majority of 
representatives of a local municipality were elected as minority candidates, then they could 
simultaneously transform the municipality into an MSG, which, in turn, also had to carry out 
the full range of local tasks. This prioritized form of MSG was intended especially for those 
settlements that had mostly minority inhabitants; it was often portrayed as territorial 
autonomy, but in practice the municipalities could turn it against local minority interests – as 
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happened in various instances. The mostly local members of MSGs had the right to vote as 
electors indirectly for the minority bodies in Budapest and at the national level. At each level 
a majoritarian electoral system was introduced: candidates with the highest number of votes 
won seats (block vote). Consequently, however, certain sub-groups within divided 
communities were underrepresented or excluded, especially at the national level. 
The number of MSGs increased from cycle to cycle (see Figure), which could be due to 
growing consciousness as reflected by census data but also to a less favourable phenomenon. 
At the elections, however, difficulties were encountered in implementing minorities’ right to 
establish MSGs. Another issue was that minority rights applied to Hungarian citizens as a 
whole. As one result, the number of votes cast was significantly beyond even the estimated 
number of minorities, and these ‘sympathy-votes’ coming from the ethnic majority usually 
advantaged those candidates whose last names started with the first letters of the alphabet, a 
phenomenon which introduced serious distortions in minority public life (Szabó 2005: 225). It 
was even more serious and posed a threat for the entire model that some of the persons 
elected were presumably or obviously non-members of the specific community. Since mostly 
local minority representatives elected indirectly the MSGs in the capital and at the national 
level, those could also be affected by abuses (as well as the preferential mandates for minority 
candidates in local governments). The ethno-business factor gained importance in intra-
community conflicts14 and debates between local governments and MSGs.  
In order to reduce the incidence of abuses, pursuant to the 2005 law, the right to vote was 
limited to members of the recognized minorities. Minority voters now had to declare their 
affiliation by previously registering in minority electoral rolls administered by the head of the 
local electoral office, who, however, had no competence to assess affiliation with the 
minority. This simplified the system by reducing the number of local types of MSG; the 
election of the only remaining form could be held if the number of registered voters of a given 
minority in a settlement reached 30 by the established deadline. Notwithstanding these 
amendments, both the results of 2006 and 2010 elections and some local scandals raised 
further doubts about whether the changes had achieved their goal.15 The law imposed further 
requirements on minority candidates: only certain minority associations had the right to run 
candidates, who were furthermore obliged to make statements on their knowledge of 
language, culture and traditions, and were not previously members of an MSG of any other 
minority. The new law also cancelled the mechanism of gaining preferential mandates in local 
governments, a form of access to local decision-making that was especially important to 
Roma. Taking into account the needs of larger minorities, the 2005 law created the county-
territorial level of MSGs, which had previously existed only in Budapest. In their electoral 
system as well as that of the national ones, there was a shift from the majoritarian to the list 
proportional type, in order to ensure the representation of diverse interest groups and to 
ensure that national MSGs would serve as the “parliaments” of minorities by fostering 
discussions and mutual understanding.16 Besides the deficit in community legitimacy, the 
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minority elections could not fully meet the other requirements of elections (Katz 1997): the 
choice was rather limited, since the number of candidates was significantly greater than the 
number of representatives only in the case of the divided minorities. Further, as electoral 
success did not require a certain number of valid votes, voter participation was not 
encouraged (Dobos 2013).  
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Figure: The results of local MSG elections, 1994-2010 
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The major competences and funding of MSGs 
Financial considerations and the fears of municipalities concerning the possibility of 
autonomy creating ‘dual administrations’, resulted in a separation of form and function. The 
basic structure of the MSGs followed that of the non-territorial autonomies, to which their 
responsibilities and tasks did not correspond. MSGs questioned the lack of adequate powers 
and rights, the dependence on municipalities, and the uncertain regulations (Csefkó-Pálné 
1999). In this respect the 2005 law made progress in further regulating various issues 
concerning functions, tasks, competences, and the financial and infrastructural background. 
Generally, they had weak powers, most of which would not have required an elected form of 
autonomy. At the local level the most powerful right was a veto, which, after 2005, covered 
any municipal decrees affecting the minorities in the fields of local media, the promotion of 
traditions and culture, and the collective use of language. The appointment of the heads of 
minority institutions and local decisions concerning the education of persons belonging to 
minorities also required the MSGs’ approval. The national level of MSGs similarly had the 
power of veto in decisions on the preservation and conservation of minority settlements, 
minority architectural monuments, and governmental decrees on the implementation of the 
Act on Public Education.  
In further developing cultural autonomy, great emphasis was laid on the provision of minority 
institutions that enabled both local and national MSGs to found, administer and take over 
certain educational and cultural institutions at various levels. While in the 1990s these 
remained mostly on paper, in the 2000s, due to the amendments, remarkable progress could 
be observed in the extension of different minority institutions (schools, theatres, research and 
cultural centres, media).  
Even before the outbreak of the global financial crisis, which had a particularly detrimental 
effect on Hungary, one of the most vulnerable countries in the region, complex and 
controversial issues surrounding the socio-economic integration of the Roma were brought to 
the fore. The situation of the Roma raised the question, among others, of whether and to what 
extent the major goals of minority law and the legal and institutional framework had met their 
basic needs and expectations, as Roma MSGs mostly have to deal with social problems, even 
though they are not supposed to do so (Kállai 2005a: 308. Kovats 1999: 150-151. Molnár-
Schafft 2003. Waters-Guglielmo 1996).  
MSGs at all levels were entitled to normative state support, the precise amounts being 
determined by the annual acts on the central budget. Domestic and foreign organizations, 
foundations, and private individuals could also contribute to the financial support of the 
minorities in Hungary. Their financial management was supervised by the State Audit Office, 
while the administrative and legal supervision was the task of the metropolitan and county 
government offices. Earlier, each MSG was entitled to the same amount of normative support, 
irrespective of the local size of the community or the needs arising, although in many cases 
there were greater needs in less developed rural regions (Eiler-Kovács 2002). In general, 
opportunities for minority-related activities largely depended on cooperation between 
municipalities and minority self-governments, and on local capacities. In 2008, as part of the 
ongoing struggle against ethno-business, the amount was split into two portions: each MSG 
continued to receive the same annual amount, while the allocation of the remaining 25% was 
based on the performance of their key functions.17 The decisions on the submitted 
applications were regularly made by a special state committee, in which delegates of the 
national MSGs also took part in an advisory capacity. The committee could keep under 
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review the activities of MSGs, and it concluded that a significant part of them were not 
performing any public or local tasks.  
The findings of previous research on MSG members revealed that there were considerable 
differences in their social status and educational level: while the proportion of unskilled and 
often unemployed representatives was high among the Roma, other minorities had mostly 
well-educated, employed or self-employed intellectuals (Csefkó-Pálné 1999: 76-77). Research 
on specific communities added that the social prestige of minority activists, whose work was 
unpaid, was lower than that of people involved in other forms of public and local activities, 
and this could explain, for instance, the overrepresentation of women and pensioners from the 
educational and cultural sectors in the German MSGs. This posed the question of succession,  
and the future involvement of younger generations (Váradi 2002: 184). By contrast, in Roma 
MSGs, women have tended to be considerably underrepresented, as shown in the latest 
surveys. On the other hand, drawing on education and employment indicators, gradual 
progress could be observed (Bindorffer 2011. Kállai 2005b). 
THE CHANGES IN THE NEW REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 
  
Constitutional provisions 
The political- legal measures of the right-wing government that came into power in 2010 have 
brought serious changes in various fields in a very short time. The most important change was 
the adoption of the new Fundamental Law on 18th April 2011. This act replaced the former 
1949 constitution, which, in line with the transition, had been significantly amended several 
times since 1989. The Venice Commission criticized the rapidity of the process of elaborating 
and adoption the new Fundamental Law. It also drew attention to the significant lack of 
transparency and public debate.18 Obviously, the situation of the minorities could not remain 
unaffected either. Indeed, the new constitutional provisions, coupled with the new law on 
minorities, have greatly changed the institutional arrangements.  
Besides returning to the term ‘nationalities’, which was in use before 1990, the Fundamental 
Law also significantly alters the concept of nation. Like most other constitutions in the region, 
both the previous and the new Hungarian constitutions illustrate how difficult it is to define 
the political community and reconcile the different concepts of the nation. The new 
Hungarian constitution seems to prefer the ethnocultural conception. However, until its 
adoption, the civic-neutral concept dominated the legal sphere, which defined the common 
entity in terms of citizenship. The civic-neutral term ‘people’ was combined with the national-
ethnic approach (Deets 2005), while the more ethnocultural understanding of the nation 
covering those who identify themselves in ethnic terms, speak the language as native 
language, became much more influential in public discourse after the Treaty of Trianon, and it 
regained its influence during the transition. The amended 1949 constitution declared that the 
supreme power was vested in the people, that the national and ethnic minorities were 
constituent parts of the state, and that the state’s paramount duty was to protect them.19 Still, 
interestingly enough, it referred only indirectly to the presence of the overwhelming 
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Hungarian majority, especially in the ‘responsibility clause’ for the fate of Hungarians living 
abroad.20 
By contrast, the new Preamble, the National Avowal, which still recognizes “the nationalities 
living with us” as state constituents, is written in the name of “we the members of the 
Hungarian nation”. It follows, therefore, and this is the opinion of the Venice Commission,21 
that ethnic Hungarians share the power with the nationalities who are not considered to have 
been part of the people behind the Fundamental Law’s adoption. In fact, however, several 
national MSGs expressed their opinions during the elaboration of the Fundamental Law. The 
more pronounced responsibility for the Hungarian minorities as well as the much disputed 
provision that, contrary to the previous constitution, declares Hungarian as the official 
language deserving protection,22 also indicate an intention to strengthen the ethnic elements. 
The Fundamental Law, however, includes certain provisions from the previous constitution, 
including the right of minorities to use their native languages and names, to promote their 
cultures, to be educated in their mother tongue, and to create local and national self-
governments. Even so, it does not declare their general protection and collective participation 
in public life. Moreover, it terminated the independent position of the Minority Rights 
Ombudsman. Instead it aims to fill a significant gap in the institutional framework when it 
states that minorities shall contribute to parliament’s work.23 With respect to preventing 
electoral abuses, it declares that those Hungarian citizens who belong to any nationality shall 
have the right to freely express and preserve their identities.  
Membership and elections  
The new minority law extends its personal scope to non-Hungarian citizens belonging to 
minorities, including EU citizens, refugees, and immigrants residing in Hungary. This was 
indeed an old minority demand. As a result of the changes, in 2014, these groups also have 
the right to vote for, and be elected to, MSGs. However, this state of affairs will only last for 
one term, as the law will later cover only Hungarian citizens. In the case of the Roma, it 
replaces the term ‘Gypsy’ with ‘Roma’, which undoubtedly sounds more acceptable in terms 
of political correctness but does not suit the self-definition of each subgroup. As to the 
languages used by the minorities, the law additionally recognizes Hungarian in the case of the 
Armenian and Roma communities, but when defining the term minority it still states that 
minorities are distinguished by their languages, among other factors,. Most members of these 
two communities are apparently Hungarian-speaking, but Armenian speakers fear the change 
may lead to the violation of their linguistic rights.  
During the formulation process, the Minority Ombudsman criticized the draft on the grounds 
that it is still based on the principle of free choice of identity and lacks any further safeguards 
to prevent electoral abuses. Indeed, the affiliation of candidates to minority rolls is not 
reviewed on the basis of certain criteria, but minority registers have become permanently 
updated and minority organizations have access to them. Continuing the struggle against 
ethno-business, some additional changes have been introduced to prevent abuses, of which the 
most relevant is that from 2014, at the local level, an election may be called only when the 
number of minority individuals of a given community reaches 25, according not to the former 
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rolls but to the aggregated results of the latest census (of 2011). Critical voices raised by 
minority organizations and the Ombudsman argue that, besides the different nature of the 
procedures, the census cannot offer an overall view of the minority situation and records 
children and others who do not have voting rights. On the one hand, there were definitely 
hundreds of settlements in which minority elections were held by the adequate number of 
registered voters even though the number of minority inhabitants had been under 30 (or even 
there was nobody) at the census of 2001. On the other hand, the opposite is true for other 
cases in which there were at least 30 minority persons, but they have not organized 
themselves and created an MSG. The census results will, furthermore, play an important role 
in relation to language rights and the financial support granted to local MSGs. Both these 
factors are conditional upon the census figures, according to the new provisions.    
The law reintroduces the system of transformed MSGs. This option was generally opposed by 
the minorities. A municipality may be transformed where more than half of local voters are 
simultaneously registered as minority voters from the same community and more than half of 
the elected representatives have won their seats as minority candidates. This type might serve 
just as an incentive for certain groups, because the results of the latest local elections indicate 
an absence of localities fulfilling both criteria, even though Roma organizations in particular 
ran candidates and in some municipalities registered minority voters constituted local 
majorities. Similarly, the new system reintroduces the possibility of securing preferential 
minority mandates in municipalities, a measure that had previously been repealed due to 
abuses. The electoral system has been amended to the extent that while previously only the 
local level had been elected directly by registered minority voters, from the next elections 
territorial and national MSGs will be established in the same way. One may vote for the 
territorial level where at least 10 local elections have been called in a certain county or 
Budapest. In contrast, there is no such precondition at the national level. Under the new rules, 
voters who live in localities where there were fewer than 25 minority persons according to 
census, and thus local elections could not be held, may also participate in the election of the 
territorial and national MSGs,. The law still does not lay down any threshold of voter turnout; 
for instance, at the local level, victory may be achieved even by the margin of a single vote. 
The election of both territorial and national levels remains proportional. 
 
Changes in the competences and funding of MSGs  
Act 131 of 2010 on Preparing New Legislation and on Public Discussions on Drafts has 
limited the scope of minority veto power. Indeed, there has been a shift from the previous 
right of consent (approval) to the right of consultation. Reflecting the new circumstances, the 
Minister for Public Administration and Justice and the national MSGs signed a strategic 
partnership agreement in 2011. Minority bodies can still run their own educational and 
cultural institutions, but all the other schools have been taken over by the state and  are now 
managed and maintained by a national body.   
The system of allocating central financial support to MSGs has been also modified. First, 
there has been a change in the ratios: one third of the total amount is granted for core 
functions based on the latest 2011 census data; the remaining amount is granted on the basis 
of the activity history of each applicant.24 Further, minority organizations are eligible to apply 
annually to a fund supporting their cultural and linguistic activities.  
 
Contribution to the work of the Parliament 
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The realisation of the right to parliamentary representation, which was a specific provision in 
the 1993 law, was the main political and legal demand of the minorities in Hungary after 
1990. Despite many drafts and various domestic and international critiques, the aim was never 
realized. According to the new law on elections, in the mixed electoral system, those voters 
who are registered in minority electoral rolls have the right to vote for their candidates in the 
single-mandate constituencies and for the minority lists drawn up by the national self-
governments. In such cases the 5% threshold is not applied, but they are entitled to one seat if 
they receive at least 25% of an electoral quota, thereby reducing the number of MPs to be 
elected on party lists.25 It follows that this preferential system mostly favours the larger 
communities: the Roma, Germans, Croats and Slovaks. But given that the most successful 
ethnic parties had not received more than 10-12,000 of votes at the previous elections and as 
the latest parliamentary elections in April 2014 clearly showed, even these minorities had to 
work hard to attract their potential voters. All minority lists, even those of smaller groups that 
fail to win preferential mandates, are still entitled to a parliamentary spokesperson, who, 
however, does not have voting rights. Minority MPs and spokespersons can found permanent 
parliamentary committees, pursuant to the new law on the Parliament.26 
GENERAL ASSESSMENT, FUTURE PROSPECTS  
 
In the context of the state- and nation-building efforts of the post-Communist states and their 
prioritisation of the institutional positions of the majority’s language and culture, the present 
case study supports the findings that have been published on the non-territorial autonomies of 
the region, and which underscore the controversy surrounding the continued dominance of the 
nation-state model, the extension of state control to the field of minority issues and interethnic 
relations, and all those positive expectations that led to the spread of various autonomy 
regimes. The findings suggest that these institutional examples tended to be created in a top-
down fashion, whereby symbolic and apolitical issues, such as education and culture, were 
imposed on minority groups, thereby preventing and neutralizing any potential territorial 
claims (see, for instance, Osipov 2013). 
With regard to the Hungarian model, a growing number of scholars, by focusing on 
implementation and the rhetoric of politicians, have accepted the argument that the granting 
of substantial minority rights and non-territorial autonomy was motivated principally by a 
desire to improve the situation of the Hungarian minorities abroad. In the past two decades, 
such expectations were barely realised, as the neighbouring countries – with the exception of 
the former Yugoslav states – have tended to reject the creation of autonomy regimes. 
Although these arguments may partially explain the top-down nature of policy-making, they 
ignore other factors, including such key issues as the adoption of legislation, the legitimacy 
deficit of minority organizations, the political integration of Roma and stronger ethnic 
identification among certain minority groups. Consequently, they are less capable of 
explaining how and why the instrumental policies failed to create more space for the 
minorities in the Hungarian-dominated nation-state. Further, they offer few insights on the 
failure to accommodate additional minority demands, allocate more resources, and solve the 
major institutional deficiencies, including parliamentary representation, a subject of 
international criticism.  
The return to the term ‘nationalities’ in the new legislation was officially justified as an effort 
to go beyond the dichotomy of majority versus minorities and highlight the contribution of the 
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minority communities with their distinct ethnocultural features to the culture of both the 
Hungarian state and nation. Still, one may ask whether the ethnocultural definition of the 
nation facilitates the strengthening of the Hungarian components of minority identities, or 
whether the ethnicization of public discourse, a further extension of cultural autonomy, and 
transnational migration processes, will eventually lead to a preference for the ethnic elements, 
to more conscious communities, and to an increasing need for the better implementation of 
minority rights. Further, since many assess the socio-demographic processes as a gradual and 
irreversible assimilation process, a view supported by the relevant census data on the decline 
of minority language use, the question arises as to whether the creation of the Hungarian 
model was too late to slow down and possibly reverse these tendencies. It has also been 
shown that MSGs were not created to address the complex problems of the socio-economic 
integration of the Roma, but to help minorities preserve and develop their identities. While 
public opinion is critical of the somewhat exaggerated phenomenon of ethno-business,27 the 
support given by the parliamentary parties to the system of MSGs is also favourable to the 
maintenance of the Hungarian model.     
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